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Metasemantics and Metaethics 




Metaethicists disagree about the semantic content of normative and evaluative terms. 
According to traditional metaethical realists, the semantic role of normative terms is 
similar to that of natural kind terms: adjectives like ‘morally right’ pick out a property 
as their reference and all competent users of the expression co-refer. Error theorists 
and fictionalists agree that the semantic role of normative terms is to pick out a 
property, but doubt that any such property is instantiated. Contextualists hold that the 
reference of normative terms varies according to the context of utterance; relativists 
hold that the truth of normative claims should be evaluated with respect to the 
standards of an interpreter; and expressivists maintain that the semantic role of 
normative terms is to express the motivational states of the speaker. Similar positions 
have been developed for evaluative terms like ‘morally good’ or ‘brave’. For ease of 
exposition, we’ll focus primarily on normative terms in this chapter, but the issues 
discussed generalize to evaluative terms. 
 
To adjudicate such disagreements, we need to ask how the semantic content of 
linguistic expressions in general gets determined. What makes it the case that certain 
words (and the thoughts they express) have the semantic contents they do? A 
metasemantic theory seeks to answer this question. Ultimately, metasemantics should 
explain the relationship between a psychological state (competence with the meaning 
of a normative term) and a semantic content (the contribution made by that word to 
the correct interpretation of the utterance in which it occurs). For instance, if proper 
names refer to individuals, then what makes it the case that competence with the 
meaning of a name like ‘Aristotle’ guarantees that you refer to a specific individual 
on every occasion of use? To answer such questions, a metasemantic theory must 
explain which facts about the subject’s use of a name are relevant to fixing the 
reference (e.g. facts about her internal cognitive organization, her inferential or 
recognitional dispositions, her history of worldly interactions, her social interactions 
with others, etc.) and how those facts suffice to single out a specific individual as the 
reference regardless of variation in background beliefs and empirical facts about the 
context of use. More generally, a metasemantics must explain how the states that 
constitute semantic competence ground the assignment of specific semantic contents.  
 
There are a wide range of views in the literature about which specific factors may be 
relevant to determining semantic contents of expressions – including, for example, 
facts about the subject’s cognitive and motivational dispositions, sociological facts 
about her linguistic community, facts about her physical environment, anthropological 
facts about human nature, historical facts about natural selection, or irreducible 
normative facts about morality or rationality (assuming there are any). But an account 
that reduces meaning facts to, say, sociological facts still needs to go on to explain 
how those facts are linked to this particular utterance if it’s to ground an 
interpretation of that utterance. The same goes for dispositional, anthropological, 
historical, or other factors that might figure in a full account of how contents are 
determined – the relevant factors must all be linked to token utterances to explain how 
the semantic content of the utterance is fixed. So metasemantic theories can all be 
thought of as providing competing accounts of the relation in virtue of which 
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particular psychological states – like a competent use of a term or a thought deploying 
a particular concept – have their semantic contents. 
 
In the case of normative terms, we can formulate the metasemantic challenge as 
follows: 
How does the state that constitutes competence with the meaning of a 
normative term guarantee that any competent use of that term has semantic 
content X? 
All metaethical positions assume that normative terms have specific semantic 
contents, so they all assume that a correct metasemantics would vindicate their 
preferred account of semantic content.  
 
Answering this metasemantic question has been seen as a particularly difficult 
challenge for traditional normative realists. Because they hold that all competent 
speakers pick out the very same property with their use of normative terms, traditional 
realists must explain how such co-reference is possible given persistent disagreement 
about the applicability conditions of normative terms. On the face of it, there seems to 
be much wider scope for disagreement about the applicability conditions for ‘right’ 
than for such terms as ‘chair’ or ‘water’. Radical and persistent disagreement about 
which things are chairs would normally lead us to conclude that we were not using 
words to pick out the same property. So the worry is that we should draw a similar 
conclusion in the normative case. If there is no plausible way to explain co-reference 
in the face of normative disagreement (Björnsson 2012), this would be a good reason 
to favor other metaethical positions that can explain how sameness of semantic 
content is guaranteed by speakers’ competence. More generally, the challenge for all 
metaethicists is to show how semantic contents can be settled despite non-
convergence among competent speakers’ understanding and use of normative terms.  
  
In this chapter, we’ll survey different metasemantic approaches to explaining how the 
content of normative terms is determined. We divide the accounts into two broad 
groups: internalist and externalist approaches diverge over what’s required for 
semantic competence and how facts about competence determine semantic contents. 
Since the non-convergence problem for context-invariant realism has received the 
most critical attention in the literature, we will use that position as our primary 
example for illustrating different metasemantic approaches. But along the way, we’ll 
highlight how the issues we discuss generalize to other metaethical positions. In the 
final section, we focus on recent developments in metaethics that bring a more 
nuanced understanding of the role of compositional semantic theorizing in linguistics 
into the metaethical debate. Metaethicists have traditionally assumed a 
straightforward relationship between the content of normative and evaluative terms 
and the content of the thoughts those terms are used to express. But a theory of the 
compositional semantics for language is not equivalent to a theory of thought content, 
and recently some theorists have argued that this insight can help to counter one of the 
main challenges to expressivism, the Frege-Geach problem.  
 
1. The metasemantic task 
A metasemantic theory should explain both (i) what constitutes competence with the 
meaning of a particular expression and (ii) how meeting those competence conditions 
ensures that the use of that expression has a particular semantic content (see 
(Peacocke 1992) for this two-part division of labor). 
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We’ll assume that there are genuine semantic facts of both these types. In doing so, 
we set aside both skepticism about the determinacy of semantic content (e.g. Kripke 
1982) and skepticism about individuating fine-grained meanings (e.g. Quine 1951; 
Stalnaker 2008). This semantic realism is the default assumption within mainstream 
metaethics. 
 
It’s worth saying a few words about how meaning, semantic competence, and 
semantic content are related. A semantic content is the contribution made by a word 
to the correct interpretation of an utterance in which it occurs. For instance, a name 
like ‘Hesperus’ may contribute a reference, Venus, to the truth-conditions of 
utterances in which it occurs, or it may contribute a contextually restricted variable, or 
a descriptive condition. We’d like to stress that semantic contents in this sense need 
not be referential – they can be context-dependent functions or markers of expressive 
significance. 
 
On our usage, meaning is a finer-grained notion than semantic content. For instance, 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ may share the same semantic content, yet differ in 
meaning. This fine-grained notion of meaning is grounded in (broadly psychological) 
ways of grasping an expression’s semantic content. We call these ways of grasping a 
given semantic content ‘competence conditions’. Thus, token uses of ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorus’ differ in meaning just in case they are governed by distinct competence 
conditions. Conversely, when token uses of an expression are governed by the same 
competence conditions (as in ‘Hesperus = Hesperus’), those uses are guaranteed to 
have the same semantic content – since particular ways of grasping a content must 
determine which content is grasped.  
 
Now let’s consider our dual metasemantic task. Suppose that ‘x is nuba’ is a 
normative predicate in a foreign language. The first metasemantic question is:  
Semantic competence: In virtue of what does someone count as competent 
with the meaning of this term?  
To fully answer this question, we must specify competence conditions: particular 
psychological facts about the use of an expression (perhaps together with non-
psychological background facts) that are necessary and sufficient for competence with 
the standard meaning of ‘nuba’. Notice that these conditions must be specific enough 
to distinguish competence with the meaning of ‘nuba’ from competence with any 
other possible meaning. In effect, a theory of semantic competence individuates 
distinct ways of grasping particular semantic contents. An account of competence 
with specific expressions like ‘nuba’, moreover, should fit within a general theory of 
semantic competence with arbitrary expressions in a language.  
 
‘Nuba’, we are supposing, has certain semantic properties: it is either representational 
or expressive, context-sensitive or context-neutral, etc. Within these general 
categories, moreover, we can distinguish the specific content expressed by ‘nuba’ 
from that of other terms with similar representational, expressive or context-sensitive 
contents. So the second metasemantic question is: 
Semantic determination: In virtue of what do competent uses of ‘nuba’ have 
these semantic properties?  
To fully answer this question, we need a determination theory, which explains how 
specific psychological or non-psychological facts about the use of an expression are 
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relevant to determining its semantic content. Once again, the determination theory for 
a particular expression like ‘nuba’ must fit within a general determination theory for 
language and thought content. The task of the determination theory is complicated by 
the fact that there are indefinitely many different natural, functional and 
gerrymandered properties and indefinitely many of them will have significantly 
overlapping instantiation conditions. Similarly, there are potentially infinitely many 
distinct psychological state types that could be expressed, and infinitely many 
functions from contexts to extensions. Explaining why just one of these semantic 
contents is the one expressed by ‘x is nuba’ is a highly non-trivial task. 
 
We take it as common ground in metaethics that competence with the same meaning 
guarantees sameness of semantic content: anyone who satisfies the competence 
conditions for ‘x is nuba’ expresses the same content, regardless of how their 
background beliefs, motivations, or social and physical circumstances may vary. Even 
relativists and contextualists hold that a particular normative term like ‘nuba’ will 
always contribute the very same function from contexts of use and standards of 
assessment to extensions.  
 
This requirement that semantic competence secure sameness of semantic content 
places an important constraint on the relationship between a theory of competence 
and a determination theory: 
Linking constraint: The determination theory must appeal only to facts about a 
subject’s understanding or circumstances that figure in the competence conditions 
for particular meanings.  
Suppose a specific belief or disposition is not part of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for competence with the meaning of ‘nuba’. Obviously, the determination 
theory for ‘nuba’ cannot appeal to this belief or disposition to explain how all 
competent subjects – including those who lack the belief or disposition in question – 
share the same semantic content. This means that competence conditions must be rich 
enough to single out a determinate content. At the same time, however, competence 
conditions must not build in too many substantive constraints on understanding if we 
are to allow for shared meanings over time and between subjects.  
 
Metaethicists have traditionally assumed there is a straightforward relationship 
between the contents of normative terms and the contents of the thoughts those terms 
express. One natural picture is that the meaning of the adjective ‘morally right’ is 
partly constituted by its connection to a corresponding concept, [morally right], which 
is what determines the distinctive semantic content expressed by that adjective (e.g. 
the property of moral rightness or the attitude of moral approval). There are different 
ways of conceiving the relation between the lexical entry for an expression and the 
corresponding concept it expresses. On one approach, lexical entries involve formal 
semantic “packaging” that determines how an expression will contribute to 
compositional semantics in a language and “pointers” to specific concepts that lie 
outside of the language faculty (Glanzberg 2014; Pietroski 2010). For instance, the 
lexical entry for ‘is tall’ might point to the concept of height packaged with a place-
holder for a scale and a cut-off point, which can be supplied by context. This approach 
ties lexical semantics to the thought contents literally expressed, while allowing for 
the possibility of linguistic context dependence. See (Väyrynen 2013) for an 
application to thick concepts. For a purely formal conception of linguistic meaning 
that leaves out any tie to the thought contents expressed by uses of sentences, see 
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(Yalcin 2014). As we’ll see in §4, this distinction between formal compositional 
semantics and the substantive thought contents expressed is important to 
contemporary debates about expressivism.  
 
2. Internalist theories 
The traditional approach to the dual metasemantic task is an internalist one: 
Internalism: Semantic competence and semantic contents are determined 
exclusively by physical factors inside the individual or psychological 
resources available to the individual. 
The intuitive idea is that subjects implicitly know (or have a priori access to) the 
semantic contents of their own words and thoughts. On standard internalist accounts, 
to count as competent with a given meaning, one must rely on rules or criteria for the 
correct use of an expression. The semantic content of the expression is then settled by 
those criteria, independently of facts about the individual’s external circumstances 
such as facts about: (a) her own past states, (b) her linguistic community, (c) the 
metaphysical nature of features of her environment, or (d) causal relations linking the 
speaker to (a)-(c).  
 
2.1 from simple descriptivism to neo-descriptivism 
Simple descriptivism is a paradigm internalist metasemantics. According to simple 
descriptivism, competence with the meaning of a name or predicate consists in an 
(implicit) understanding of its applicability conditions in any possible circumstance. 
To count as competent with the name ‘Aristotle’, for instance, you must be disposed 
to rely on a specific criterion that serves as your ultimate standard for identifying 
what the name applies to. The name’s semantic content is simply read off of this 
internal criterion of application. So the content of ‘Aristotle’ will be a descriptive 
condition specifiable by a definite description like ‘the last great philosopher of 
antiquity’. Since competence with the same meaning requires reliance on the same 
criterion and the criterion fully determines semantic content, it’s clear why anyone 
who meets the competence conditions is guaranteed to pick out the same content. And 
the linking constraint will be satisfied: semantic assignments depend exclusively on 
the internal states that constitute semantic competence.  
 
Simple descriptivism, however, came under sustained attack by semantic externalists 
in the 1970’s and 1980’s. One central objection was that construing proper names and 
natural kind terms as semantically equivalent to definite descriptions conflicts with 
our semantic intuitions about de re modal claims like ‘Aristotle could have died as a 
child’ or ‘Lemons might be blue’ (Kripke 1980; Putnam 1970). A further objection 
was that simple descriptivism underestimates the scope for ignorance and error on the 
part of competent speakers: one can be competent with the meaning of ‘gold’ without 
grasping a failsafe criterion for the correct application of that expression (Kripke 
1980; Putnam 1970; Burge 1979). This fallibility, moreover, is crucial to the stability 
of meaning through open-ended inquiry and debate (Putnam 1973) and to our ability 
to represent genuinely objective features of our environment (Putnam 1975; Millikan 
1984; Stalnaker 2008). If such objections are sound, then simple descriptivism is 
extensionally inadequate: its semantic competence conditions are too demanding and 
its determination theory generates implausible contents.  
 
In response, internalists developed neo-descriptivist metasemantic theories. Neo-
descriptivists seek to vindicate the commonsense view that the semantic function of 
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expressions like ‘Gödel’, ‘water’ or ‘arthritis’ is to stably represent particular objects, 
kinds or properties, even though we may be ignorant or mistaken about the 
instantiation conditions of these features. Their proposal is to loosen the connection 
between competence conditions and semantic content. On this approach, semantic 
competence may consist in criteria that determine the reference only relative to 
empirical facts about one’s actual environment. Competence with ‘water’, for 
instance, may consist in having a conditional criterion for identifying the essential 
nature of the reference on the basis of information about the chemical nature of the 
liquids in one’s actual historical environment: if your environment is like Twin Earth 
then water = XYZ, if your environment is like Earth then water = H2O, and so on. But 
you cannot know what water is without empirical information about your actual 
environment. So neo-descriptivist can agree that a competent speaker may be ignorant 
or mistaken about the essential nature of water. Even so, neo-descriptivism holds that 
competence with the same meaning provides a conditional guarantee of sameness of 
reference: if the relevant environmental facts are the same, then two competent uses 
of ‘water’ are guaranteed to pick out the same reference (Peacocke 1992, Jackson 
1998a and b). Thus neo-descriptivism vindicates the core internalist idea that both 
competence conditions and semantic content are determined (in part or wholly) by a 
speaker’s internal criteria for using an expression.  
 
In metaethics, neo-descriptivism has been used to explain competent speakers’ 
ignorance and error about the instantiation conditions of normative properties. 
According to Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit’s ‘moral functionalism’, for instance, 
competence with the meaning of the moral term ‘fair’ is constituted by a specific 
pattern of inferential, recognitional, epistemic, predictive and motivational 
dispositions, which together constitute the subject’s implicit ‘folk theory’ of morality 
(Jackson and Pettit 1995, 22-23). The semantic content of ‘x is fair’ is the property 
determined by the upshot of ideal reflective equilibrium, starting from this folk theory 
and taking into account any empirical facts that are relevant from the point of view of 
that theory. In a similar spirit, Christopher Peacocke holds that competence with 
moral terms consists in the subject’s dispositions to reason in accord with in a set of 
core moral principles. The applicability conditions of moral terms – and hence the 
properties they pick out – must be justifiable on the basis of these a priori moral 
principles together with empirical facts about circumstances of evaluation (Peacocke 
2004). These neo-descriptivist accounts share a common internalist structure: the 
competence conditions allow one to identify the precise instantiation conditions for 
normative properties through empirical inquiry and ideal reflection. So on this 
account, ordinary speakers can be ignorant or mistaken about the instantiation 
conditions of morally rightness, even though the upshot of ideal empirically informed 
reflection is guaranteed to be correct.   
 
An important advantage of neo-descriptivism is its capacity to vindicate intuitive 
judgments about the semantic contents of our words and thoughts. Although 
externalists emphasize our fallibility about de re necessities, their arguments typically 
rely on our reflective, empirically informed judgments about which properties are 
picked out. Because neo-descriptivism takes reference to be determined by ideal, 
empirically informed reflection, the approach is immune to intuitive counterexamples. 
Neo-descriptivism also affords a clear explanation of why all competent speakers are 
guaranteed to co-refer: any two individuals who rely on the same criteria must co-
refer if they share the same empirical context. Moreover, the neo-descriptivist 
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metasemantics is perfectly general: neo-descriptivism about normative terms is part of 
a well-motivated uniform metasemantics for of all terms, including names, natural 
kind terms, commonsense functional kind terms, and logical operators (Peacocke 
1992).  
 
2.2 meaning stability & convergence 
One central difficulty for neo-descriptivism is vindicating the stability of meaning 
over time and between speakers. By commonsense standards, novices and experts 
share the same meanings when they use terms like ‘water’ or ‘is morally right’, and 
there is no change in meaning when rational inquiry leads novices to become more 
expert. But prior to further empirical inquiry the novice’s ultimate reference-fixing 
criterion might hinge on deference to experts’ criterion, whereas the expert’s criterion 
will not. In such cases, neo-descriptivists must deny there are stable shared meanings: 
novices and experts rely on different criteria, which will generate divergent verdicts 
about reference relative to variations in the social environment.  
 
The problem of vindicating stability of meaning is particularly acute for normative 
terms, since competence with terms like ‘x is right’ seems consistent with 
disagreement about any particular application of the term or any general criterion of 
application. Explaining meaning stability is thus the crux of the familiar disagreement 
problem in metaethics: how can different speakers be competent with the same 
meaning if they diverge in their criteria for using a term? 
 
The disagreement problem is endemic to internalist metasemantics: it is generated by 
internalists’ commitment to explaining competence with the same meaning in terms 
of matching internal criteria of use, and then using these criteria to explain the 
determination of semantic content. Because traditional realists claim that normative 
terms always pick out the very same property, the disagreement problem for realism 
will arise from divergence in speakers’ applicability criteria. By commonsense 
standards, two speakers can diverge in virtually any aspect of their understanding of 
which actions are right without compromising their competence with the same 
meaning. If their criteria of application diverge substantially, how can their internal 
states guarantee that they single out the very same property as the reference? A 
similar problem arises for expressivists who identify competence with normative 
terms with internal criteria for using those terms to express motivational states. An 
internalist determination theory might then assign an expressive semantic content on 
the basis of these criteria of use. Intuitively, however, competent speakers can diverge 
in the precise motivational dispositions they associate with normative judgments like 
‘x is fair’ or ‘x is right’: one can become disaffected or cynical without eo ipso losing 
competence with the meaning of moral terms (Merli 2008). But on an internalist 
metasemantics, a shift in core motivational criteria suffices for a difference in 
expressivist meaning. A similar problem will face internalists who favour 
contextualist or relativist semantic contents. In order to share precisely the same 
meanings, different individuals must rely on implicit criteria for using a term that 
relativize normative and evaluative claims to the same parameters in the same ways. 
But given the scope of normative disagreement, it’s not obvious that there is any such 
convergence among competent speakers (Silk 2013). 
 
A natural reply on behalf of internalists of all stripes is to appeal to ideal convergence 
in order to explain sameness of meaning. At the ideal limit of reflection, competent 
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speakers would independently converge on precisely the same criteria for using an 
expression. But skeptics can argue that there is no good empirical reason to believe in 
ideal convergence. And appealing to ideal convergence would make sameness of 
meaning epistemically opaque to ordinary subjects placed in non-ideal circumstances: 
it may be far from obvious, for instance, whether two tokens of ‘Hesperus’ express 
the same meaning.  
 
One might wonder why an internalist should be worried by the failure to explain 
meaning identity over time and between subjects. Mere similarity of meaning might 
suffice to explain how information is normally preserved in communication and 
memory.  
 
However, meaning identity is crucial to explaining logical relations. In order for two 
claims to stand in a relation of direct logical contradiction (e.g. ‘Hesperus is bright’ 
vs. ‘Hesperus is not bright’), the contents of the non-logical expressions must be 
strictly identical. Moreover, mere sameness of semantic content does not suffice for 
logical relations: the sameness must be guaranteed by competence with the same 
meaning. Consider the contrast between ‘Hesperus = Hesperus’ and ‘Hesperus = 
Phosphorus’. The first claim is logically guaranteed to be true in virtue of meaning of 
‘=’ and the fact that both tokens of ‘Hesperus’ express the same meaning (and 
therefore must represent the very same thing if they represent anything at all). So if 
you’re competent with the meaning of the sentence, its truth will seem obvious and 
rationally incontrovertible. Not so for ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’: one may firmly 
believe this claim, but its truth seems to depend on contingent empirical facts and 
hence it won’t be rationally incontrovertible. Insofar as internalists wish to explain 
logical relations like direct contradiction, entailment, and trivial identity of content 
over time and between subjects, they must offer an account of meaning identity, not 
just similarity of meaning. One possible response on behalf of the internalist is to 
deny such logical relations hold over time and between speakers using normative 
terms. For an internalist-friendly explanation of the surface phenomena of 
disagreement between subjects that does not posit such logical relations, see (Plunkett 
and Sundell 2013). 
 
3. Externalism 
Metasemantic externalism is simply the negation of internalism:  
Externalism: It’s not the case that both semantic competence and semantic 
contents are determined exclusively by physical factors inside the individual 
or psychological resources available to the individual.  
We’ll focus first on externalist accounts of content determination, which have played 
a prominent role in defending traditional realism in both the philosophy of science 
and metaethics. We’ll then consider externalist approaches to competence conditions. 
 
3.1 causal theories of reference 
A central theoretical advantage of externalism is its ability to explain the stability of 
reference despite variation in understanding over time and between subjects. In the 
case of names and natural kind terms, many externalists have suggested that content is 
partly determined by causal-historical or nomic relations linking subjects’ 
representational states to particular objects, kinds or properties in their environment. 
It’s important to distinguish such causal externalist theories from neo-descriptivist 
theories that include a subject’s conception of causal roles as part of her core criteria 
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for applying certain terms – a position known as ‘causal descriptivism’ (Kroon 1987). 
Whereas causal descriptivists take the ultimate arbiter of reference determination to 
be the subjects’ conception of the relevant causal role, causal externalists take the 
ultimate arbiter of reference determination to be a causal-explanatory theory of the 
subject’s linguistic or conceptual practices. For instance, Michael Devitt defends his 
causal-historical account of reference determination as meeting general desiderata on 
empirical theorizing in linguistics (Devitt 1981, 1991), and Ruth Millikan defends her 
teleosemantic account as fitting within the explanatory paradigm for theorizing about 
biological systems honed by natural selection (Millikan 1984). On such causal 
externalist accounts, an individual’s current criteria for applying a term play no 
decisive role in settling its reference.  
 
In metaethics, Richard Boyd’s ‘causal regulation’ theory is the most fully developed 
and influential version of the causal externalist approach (Boyd 1988; see also Brink 
1989; Railton 1986; Sturgeon 1985). The reference of both scientific and moral 
predicates, Boyd argues, depends on a causal feedback relation of ‘accommodation’ 
between a system of representations and a system of homeostatic property clusters in 
the world. This account allows for variabililty in speakers’ criteria for applying a term 
without risk of changing the reference: an external causal relation can still causally 
‘lock’ subjects’ use of a word onto the same property despite differences in their 
internal criteria.  
 
In the philosophy of mind and language, causal externalism has been criticized as: (i) 
too vague to single out a determinate reference, and (ii) singling out the intuitively 
wrong reference in many cases (for overviews, see (Loewer 1999; Neander 2006)). In 
metaethics, these general problems for causal externalism seem especially damaging 
in the case of normative terms, which are less tolerant of indeterminacy and less 
beholden to causal-explanatory considerations than scientific terms (Schroeter and 
Schroeter 2013). 
 
Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons press a different objection to causal externalism: 
they contend that Putnam’s Twin Earth argument in favor of externalism for natural 
kind terms like ‘water’ does not generalize to normative terms like ‘good’ (Horgan 
and Timmons 1992). Horgan and Timmons argue that, while we have reason to accept 
that causal factors affect the reference of natural kind terms like ‘water’, we have no 
such reason to accept that causal factors affect the reference of moral terms. However, 
the MTE argument is controversial. Janice Dowell argues that the MTE argument 
does not parallel Putnam’s original Twin Earth argument, and that the sort of 
intuitions elicited by MTE are not relevant to the explanatory project of causal 
externalist metasemantics. She concludes MTE has no probative force against causal 
externalism (Dowell 2015).  
 
3.2 reference magnets 
A second type of externalist account of reference-fixing appeals to metaphysical facts 
about the referential candidates themselves, rather than causal relations linking 
representational states to referential candidates. Many metaphysicians hold that some 
objects, kinds, and properties are objectively more natural or fundamental than 
others. David Lewis suggested objective metaphysical naturalness makes a feature a 
better referential candidate: a property’s naturalness makes it a “reference magnet” 
(Lewis 1983).  
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Lewis originally proposed this metaphysical constraint on reference determination as 
a way of avoiding “Putnam’s paradox”. Hilary Putnam argued that Lewis’s global 
neo-descriptivism together with his metaphysical realism about referential candidates 
leads to radical indeterminacy of reference. In response, Lewis added a further, mind-
independent metaphysical constraint on reference determination (Lewis 1984). On 
Lewis’s account, the correct semantic interpretation of an individual’s words and 
thoughts is determined by the total assignment of semantic contents that provides the 
best balance between two factors:  
(i) fit: The assignment construes the subject’s overall pattern of practical and 
cognitive dispositions as approximately satisfying norms of ideal practical 
and theoretical rationality, and  
(ii) naturalness: The assignment construes the subject’s words and thoughts as 
picking out a set of objects, kinds and properties that, considered as a 
group, are overall more natural than competing sets of referential 
candidates.  
The problem with Lewis’s earlier account was that fit alone could not single out a 
determinate reference.  
 
We’d like to emphasize four points about the role of reference magnetism in a 
determination theory. First, the metaphysical facts about naturalness must be entirely 
independent of the subject’s understanding, if they’re to solve Putnam’s paradox. The 
naturalness constraint comes into play only after we take into account the subject’s 
ideally reflective and empirically informed dispositions to make judgments about the 
nature and extension of her own words. So the relative naturalness of a property is not 
constrained by the subject’s intuitions about plausible referential candidates for a 
given domain. Second, the naturalness constraint is part of a holistic approach to 
reference determination. Causal theories like Boyd’s link individual representations 
(or clusters of representations) to referential candidates on a case-by-case basis. In 
contrast, Lewis’s Global Descriptivism provides a holistic constraint on the semantic 
interpretation of the entire representational system considered as a whole, which 
allows for interpretive trade-offs that generate semantic indeterminacy. The 
naturalness constraint is designed to counteract the effects of this holism. Third, any 
plausible interpretation must include both natural and unnatural properties in the total 
semantic assignment. On Lewis’s account, your use of words like ‘grue’ or ‘groovy’ 
can pick out highly unnatural properties, provided that this interpretation is part of a 
total semantic assignment that maximizes naturalness overall. Fourth, it follows that 
there must be two sorts of ordinal rankings of naturalness on Lewis’s account: (1) 
ranking naturalness of individual referential candidates (such as objects, properties, 
kinds) and (2) ranking the relative naturalness of sets of such referential candidates 
(which include both highly natural and highly unnatural referential candidates). Lewis 
himself only provides a toy example of such rankings, so objective ranking remains 
an outstanding issue for the approach. For a discussion of the structure and 
commitments of Lewis’s account, see (Williams 2015). 
 
Recently, some metaethicists have suggested that reference magnetism can be used to 
defend traditional context-invariant normative realism (van Roojen 2006; Dunaway 
and McPherson 2014). If moral properties are highly metaphysically natural (or 
fundamental), then they would be good referential candidates on a Lewisian approach. 
So a Lewisian metasemantics might be able to vindicate co-reference despite 
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disagreement at the ideal limit of reflection, which would neutralize the disagreement 
objection.  
 
However, the metasemantic story behind this approach has yet to be fully elaborated. 
There are general worries about whether a reference magnet approach can secure a 
determinate and plausible referential assignments for ordinary descriptive vocabulary 
(e.g. Williams 2007; Sundell 2012). In the case of metaethics, moreover, the problem 
is exacerbated by the fact that normative terms do not seem to be easily ranked on a 
single uniform scale of naturalness with causal-explanatory properties. For instance, 
it’s not obvious that there’s a principled way of ordinally ranking properties and sets 
of properties for ‘naturalness’ that would privilege a justificatory property over a 
sociological property as the reference of ‘morally right’ (Schroeter and Schroeter 
2013).  
 
3.3 externalist competence conditions 
Let’s turn to externalist approaches to competence conditions. According to 
internalism, two speakers cannot share the same meaning unless they share precisely 
matching internal criteria of use. Externalists deny this claim. Indeed, most 
externalists hold that a precise match in criteria is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
sameness of meaning or concept. Tyler Burge’s anti-individualism is a version of this 
position: 
Anti-individualism: Semantic competence doesn’t depend exclusively on 
physical factors in the individual or psychological resources cognitively 
available to the individual at a time (cf. Burge 2007, 153).  
A theory of competence, of course, must go beyond this purely negative thesis: it 
must explain how external factors combine with internal factors to ground 
competence with particular meanings.  
 
A promising approach to competence externalism is to treat inter-cognitive relations 
as necessary for competence with the same meaning: 
Relational competence: Two token cognitive states express the same meaning 
only if those tokens are linked by a specific causal-historical relation, R.   
 
Relational theories of competence disagree about the nature of R. On a Kripkean 
“causal chain” account of names, for instance, relation R consists in being actually 
linked by co-referential intentions: two speakers are competent with the same 
linguistic meaning only if they are connected via a continuous chain of linked co-
referential intentions (Kripke 1980; Devitt 1981). In contrast, Ruth Millikan’s 
teleosemantic theory takes two uses of a term to express the same meaning only if 
they are connected by a certain naturally selected for ‘copying’ relation (Millikan 
1984). Tyler Burge holds that sameness of conceptual content requires anaphora-like 
semantic memory relations linking token elements of thought within an individual and 
similar ‘content preserving’ causal links between individuals (Burge 2007). 
Philosophical proponents of ‘mental files’ like John Perry and Sam Cumming have 
posited causal coordinating relations linking individuals’ mental files to those of 
others in their linguistic community (Perry 2001; Cumming 2013). In the philosophy 
of language, some theorists have argued for relationally individuated syntactic units 
of interpretation (Kaplan 1990; Fiengo and May 2006), and others posit relational 
semantic rules linking token expressions (Fine 2007; Pinillos 2011).  
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One important advantage of a relational constraint on competence is that it allows for 
more variation in competent subjects’ substantive understanding than is possible on 
internalist accounts. Causal-historical relations between token representational states 
are supposed to carry some of the burden of securing semantic competence and 
sameness of semantic content. As a consequence, a relational account may be better 
placed to vindicate commonsense epistemic commitments about open-ended inquiry 
and debate: no particular criterion is required for logical relations among token uses 
of a term.  
 
However, such variability in understanding raises a challenge: if internal criteria 
associated with R-linked token states are highly variable, what ensures that all R-
linked tokens have precisely the same semantic content? One natural response on 
behalf of a relational theorist is to take the default unit for semantic interpretation to 
be the R-linked states considered as a group, rather than a token state considered in 
isolation (Schroeter 2012). So the default assumption would be that all R-linked uses 
of ‘Aristotle’ should be assigned the same semantic content – whether it’s the 
shipping magnate, or the philosopher, or a descriptive content, or nothing at all. 
Mutatis mutandis for ‘x is right’: the default presumption is that all R-linked tokens 
should be assigned the same semantic content. For an application of this relational 
approach to competence with normative concepts, see (Schroeter and Schroeter 
2014). (Blackburn 1991, 4-11; 1998, 59-68) also assumes social units for semantic 
interpretation.  
 
One counterintuitive consequence of relational models of competence is that subjects 
who are not connected by R will not share the same meaning. So a perfect qualitative 
duplicate of you living on a perfect duplicate planet on the other side of the galaxy 
(Duplicate Earth) would not be competent with the same meanings that you associate 
with ‘water’ or ‘right’. In response, relational theorists have explained the theoretical 
advantages of relationally individuated competence conditions that in their view 
outweigh this counterintuitive consequence (cf. Millikan 1984; Burge 2007). And the 
relational theorist can point out that non-relational internalist accounts also have 
highly counterintuitive consequences, if they make meaning unstable within rational 
inquiry and debate (Schroeter and Schroeter 2016).  
 
A second challenge to relational theories is to explain how a shift in meaning is 
possible. If being R-related is sufficient for competence with a given meaning, then it 
must also be sufficient for sameness of content. But that seems implausible. For 
instance, our current use of ‘Madagascar’ may be R-related to early Malay and Arabic 
uses of the name which refer to a part of the African mainland, but clearly there has 
been a shift in reference between then and now (Evans 1973). To allow for shifts in 
content, a relational theorist has a number of options. One is to offer an account of R 
that explains how new meanings get initiated – e.g. by new implicit ‘baptisms’ 
(Donnellan 1974). A second option is to accept that contents are always preserved by 
R-relations, but hold that new contents get layered on top of old ones: so token states 
within an R-linked tradition become multiply ambiguous (Devitt 1981; Millikan 
2000). A third option is to appeal to further constraints on sameness of meaning that 
can defeat the default presumption that R individuates the unit for semantic 
interpretation (Schroeter and Schroeter 2014). A fourth option is to deny that R can 
define a genuine meaning identity relation (i.e. reflexive, symmetric and transitive): it 
 13 
can only define ad hoc local relations of guaranteed of sameness of content (Fine 
2007; Pinillos 2011).  
 
4. The metasemantic construal of expressivism 
One important new development in metaethics is the metasemantic construal of 
expressivism. Expressivism has traditionally been characterized as a theory at the 
level of semantics: the semantic function of normative predicates in sentences like ‘x 
is wrong’ is not to attribute a property to x, but to conventionally express the 
speaker’s conative attitude towards x. This position generates the Frege-Geach 
problem: how can these expressive contents contribute to the content of complex 
sentences like ‘Jane believes that surfing isn’t wrong’? In effect, the Frege-Geach 
problem is to explain the role played by the expressive contents of subsentential 
expressions in a compositional semantic theory for a language. Given that standard 
compositional semantics is truth-conditional, it seems that expressivists must rebuild 
compositional semantics from the ground up to explain how expressive contents 
contribute to the contents of complex sentences. (For influential recent versions of the 
Frege-Geach challenge see (Zangwill 1992; van Roojen 1996 ; Unwin 1999; 
Schroeder 2008); for expressivist responses that reinterpret the function of logical 
operators, see (Blackburn 1988; Gibbard 2003)). 
 
In recent years, some theorists have argued that expressivists can accept a standard 
compositional semantics that uses a possible worlds framework to specify the truth-
conditions of normative sentences. To understand this proposal, it’s important to bear 
in mind that for the purposes of compositional semantics “possible worlds” are just 
set-theoretic constructs whose structure is suited to modeling the contribution of 
subsentential expressions to the content of whole sentences. What the elements of 
these structures represent, if anything, is irrelevant to their role in compositional 
semantics. On this approach, compositional semantics functions as an autonomous 
domain of linguistic theorizing, with its own proprietary theoretical and empirical 
constraints (cf. Yalcin 2014; Glanzberg 2014). Roughly, compositional semantics 
tells us how the language faculty delivers formal constraints on which thought 
contents can be literally expressed by uses of natural language expressions. 
Expressivists then have an easy answer to the Frege-Geach embedding problem: they 
can accept whichever compositional semantics is supported by empirical linguistics.  
 
If we reserve the term ‘semantics’ for formal compositional semantics and we use the 
term ‘semantic value’ for the abstract objects posited by such a theory, then different 
metaethical positions might be thought of as disagreeing at the level of 
metasemantics. Expressivists and representationalists can accept that the basic 
compositional structure of language is perspicuously modeled by a particular 
compositional theory. Their disagreement is over what makes it the case that 
normative expressions have certain semantic values within that compositional 
semantic theory (Chrisman 2015; Ridge 2014; Silk 2015; Pérez Carballo 2015). For 
closely related suggestions, see (Stojanovic 2012; Yalcin 2014) 
 
However, the philosophical difficulties for expressivism haven’t disappeared, they’ve 
just been relocated. The central questions in metaethics are not about formal 
semantics, but about the nature of normative thought and the use of normative 
language to communicate those thoughts. The fact that normative language conforms 
to standard compositional semantics means that the thoughts expressed by normative 
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language must conform to the entailment, consistency, and inconsistency relations 
posited by the correct compositional theory. This metasemantic requirement is a non-
trivial hermeneutical constraint on acceptable theories of which attitudes are literally 
expressed by normative language (Pérez Carballo 2014). The challenge for 
expressivists is to identify non-cognitive attitudes expressed by normative terms (in 
simple predications, in complex embedded contexts, in non-indicative sentences, in 
non-assertoric speech acts, etc.), which reflect the entailment and consistency 
relations posited by the compositional semantics for those sentences. In other words, 
expressivists must show how the semantic relations posited by the compositional 
theory are reflected in relations among the psychological states that they take to be 
expressed. This metasemantic challenge seems less daunting if one can invoke 
entailment and consistency relations among the representational contents of thoughts, 
rather than abstracting them from relations among the attitudinal aspect of thought. 
See (Ridge 2014) and (Silk 2015) for two recent proposals for how to meet this 
metasemantic challenge to attitude expressivism, and (Chrisman 2015) for an 
inferential role expressivism in the spirit of Robert Brandom’s inferential role 
semantics (Brandom 1994).  
Expressivists also face a challenge in explaining logical relations among normative 
sentences. What makes your claim ‘Lying is wrong’ logically inconsistent with my 
claim ‘Lying is not wrong’, if the contents expressed are simply divergent conative 
states towards lying? This problem is often assimilated to the Frege-Geach problem. 
But the semantic entailment captured by compositional semantics isn’t the same as 
strict logical entailment: ‘x is a bachelor’ semantically entails ‘x is unmarried’, but 
there is no logical relation among the claims expressed. Strict logical relations are 
needed to explain the nature of deductive arguments across all domains. In response, 
(Baker and Woods 2015) argue that expressivists and representationalist alike should 
appeal to the syntactic structure of sentences to explain logical relations. On standard 
accounts of philosophical logic, after all, logical relations are purely formal: ‘x is an 
unmarried man’ logically entails ‘x is a man’ because it holds true regardless of how 
one interprets the non-logical expressions. If logical relations are determined by 
formal syntactic relations, then any acceptable metasemantic theory must assign the 
same content to the same syntactic unit. Thus the expressivist need not locate logical 
relations in the clashes among attitudes expressed. The availability of this formal 
account of logic, of course, does not guarantee that there is a plausible expressivist 
interpretation of the thought contents literally communicated by normative sentences. 
Moreover, as we noted in §3.3, such an account will need to say something about 
apparent shifts in the content of syntactically individuated words. 
The general lesson of this recent work is that metaethicists of all stripes can help 
themselves to independently justified theories of the syntactic structure and 
combinatorial semantics of normative language. This move dissolves some traditional 
worries for metaethical expressivism, but structurally similar concerns may arise once 
again at the level of the thought contents expressed.  
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